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Abstract. With the Internet of Things (IoT) evolving more and more,
companies active within this area face new challenges for their Iden-
tity and Access Management (IAM). Namely, general security, resource
constraint devices, interoperability, and scalability cannot be addressed
anymore with traditional measures. Blockchain technology, however, may
act as an enabler to overcome those challenges. In this paper, general
application areas for blockchain in IAM are described based on recent
research work. On this basis, it is discussed how blockchain can address
IAM challenges presented by IoT. Finally, a corporate scenario utilizing
blockchain-based IAM for IoT is outlined to assess the applicability in
practice. The paper shows that private blockchains can be leveraged to
design tamper-proof IAM functionality while maintaining scalability re-
garding the number of clients and transactions. This could be useful for
enterprises to prevent single-point-of-failures as well as to enable trans-
parent and secure auditing & monitoring of security-relevant events.
Keywords: Identity and Access Management · Access Control · Blockchain
· Internet of Things.
1 Introduction
Identity and Access Management (IAM) has become a highly relevant task for
enterprises and organizations in recent years [20]. One major change enterprise
IAM must deal with is the concept of Internet of Things (IoT). Haller et al. [12]
define the term IoT as the integration of physical objects into information net-
works. By this means, smart devices can interact with services via the internet
and participate actively in business processes [12].
When speaking of IoT, the concept of identity does not only encompass user
identities but also extends to IoT devices and services [5]. Secure machine to
machine (M2M) communication requires reliable mechanisms to establish trust
and access control between IoT devices, data and network resources [1]. The
communicating IoT devices must be uniquely identifiable to enable authenticity
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and to prevent security breaches [3]. In order to achieve this, IAM provides the
following three main components. Zhu et al. [33] state that identity provision-
ing, update, revocation and lookup pose a core set of Identity Management
operations. The identities of all communicating entities must be secured to pre-
vent identity theft. Data and networks used by IoT devices must be protected
by Access Control mechanisms to prevent unauthorized access to enterprise
resources and confidential IoT data [3]. Finally, IAM incorporates Monitoring
& Logging functionalities to be able to store and trace critical information in
a secure and auditable manner [20]. Figure 1 summarizes these three main func-
tions of IAM.
Various enterprises consider blockchain technology to address IAM challenges
in an IoT environment [15]. A blockchain is a distributed database of verifiable
records containing transactions which are shared among participating parties.
Each transaction is verified through consensus. The records within a blockchain
are linked by cryptographic hashes. Each block contains the hash value of the
previous block [7]. For a more detailed description please confer chapter 4. Even
though several works propose blockchain technology for access control (e.g. [19,
22]), research has put little emphasis on whether and how blockchain can be
applied to the more fundamental concept of IAM in enterprises. The question
whether the blockchain technology can deal with the mentioned IAM challenges
as a whole in context of enterprise IoT has not been entirely addressed in research
yet. In this paper, the following research questions will be examined:
1. Which challenges faces IAM within an enterprise IoT environment?
2. Can blockchain technology be used as an enabler for IAM within enterprise
IoT and the corresponding challenges?
3. What is a realistic use case for blockchain-based IAM and enterprise IoT?
Our underlying research methodology is shown in Figure 2 and is based on the
principles of [13]. In order to achieve the research goals defined above, we firstly
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analyze the relevant body of knowledge for IoT and blockchain technology in
Section 2 and Section 4.1. We afterwards derive challenges which modern IAM
has to face within an enterprise IoT context (1) in Section 3. Thus, we are
able to define constraints and requirements for the integration of blockchain
approaches later on. Within (2), blockchain-based approaches for enterprise IAM
will be presented in Section 4. Furthermore, we show how each component of
IAM named above can be supported by blockchain technology. We analyze each
component under the aspect of the previously defined challenges. In Section 5, we
use the results to create a theoretical use case based on our IAM knowledge and
the existing literature (3). It intends to show the applicability of our approach.
Finally, within Section 6, advantages and challenges of blockchain usage will be
discussed (4).
Fig. 2. Methodology
2 Related Work
The topic of IAM, IoT and arising challenges has already been addressed in var-
ious research works in recent time.
Adireddy & Gottapu [1] find that IoT devices tend to be unsuitable for inten-
sive operations or large storage due to a lack of computational resource. Zhu et
al. [33] state that the large number of different entities which communicate in
IoT networks require a robust and extensible structure to enable secure Identity
Management. According to Roman et al. [25], a common framework of secure
protocols are required to enable governance and interoperability between users
and a variety of different devices. Finally, all entities and their identities must be
managed in a scalable way in terms of changing space and network requirements
over time.
Trnka & Cerny [30] propose an IAM framework which enables device cooper-
ation. The authors leverage a centralized identity store which keeps records of
all connected devices with their unique identifiers. The centralized identity store
uses role based access control (RBAC) [27] to manage device access. Device ac-
counts and role assignments are created by an administrator. Devices use tokens
4 M. Nuss et al.
for authentication. For confidential communication, devices exchange their to-
kens and compare them to the tokens stored at the central identity store [30].
Salman et al. [26] suggest the use of a gateway layer and a controller layer be-
tween the central store and IoT devices to deal with device heterogeneity. Virtual
IPv6 addresses are used as device identifiers. The controller layer provides a pub-
lic key certificate to each gateway within the network. To authenticate, things
use their unique IPv6 identifier together with a nonce that is encrypted with the
respective gateway’s public key [26].
Gusmeroli et al. [11] propose capability based access control (CapBAC) because
it provides deeper granularity as well as easy support for right delegation. Capa-
bilities are objects which are issued by entitled subjects to another subject the
capability is granted to. Capabilities must be transmitted to all subjects in the
network. To illustrate the decision process, let’s assume a situation where an em-
ployee Alice requests access temperature data of an engine system employed in
an assembly line. The responsible administrator Bob issues a capability to Alice
which contains the ID of the resource, the IDs of the both parties, the granted
rights, a validity period and Bob’s signature. Alice saves the capability to her
capability list. She can now encapsulate the capability into a service request (e.g.
an HTTP GET request) and send it to the access decision service [11].
The majority of the described IAM frameworks addresses the issue that IoT
devices tend to be resource constraint by holding only a small share of data and
logic on the devices. While Salman et al. [26] address the device heterogene-
ity problem with an additional controller layer, the other frameworks do not
explicitly explain how devices with differing hardware and software can be au-
thenticated or authorized. All IAM frameworks for IoT described in this Section
commonly leverage central trusted entities to perform IAM operations. Central-
ization generally implies reliance on a single-point-of-failure. This means that
any vulnerability could enable compromisation of a large stake of a system and
its data. A centralized approach does not support end-to-end security. Users need
a trust relationship because data security and privacy cannot be reviewed trans-
parently. Ouaddah et al. [21] further state that centralized IAM may become
too expensive in large networks in the long term.
3 IAM Challenges in Context of IoT
IoT implies several constraints for enterprise IAM. A number of recently pub-
lished research indicates the different requirements. After analyzing the content,
we were able to derive the following generalized challenges based on the body
of literature as well as on our practical experience in IAM. However, note that
our goal is not to present an exhaustive list but rather discovering the most
important challenges of IAM in the IoT context:
– Physical design constraints (e.g. mobile devices with low power)
– Need for comprehensive and secure IAM mechanisms
– Variability of identities (e.g. interoperability of heterogeneous devices)
– Network scalability
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IoT devices (e.g. an RFID tag on clothes) often do not have a high compu-
tational capacity and are low powered. Therefore different constraints based on
their physical design arise. Such devices are not able to execute highly demand-
ing cryptographic operations. This must be especially considered when it comes
to authentication and access control within an enterprise IAM. Additionally, IoT
devices need to be replaced more often because of their design constraints. Thus,
compared to traditional scenarios, the IAM lifecycle has to be executed far more
often when IoT applications are involved [1].
This leads directly to the second challenge, the need for comprehensive and
secure IAM mechanisms. As identities within an IoT context are very large
in number it has to be ensured that each device has a managed identity within
a supervised IAM platform, information about the identity of all other devices,
and the possibility to verify them. Then and only then one can provide a com-
prehensive view on all identities within an enterprise IoT as well as a secure way
for collaboration [33].
One of the further challenges restricting this is the variability of identities.
Within traditional IAM, identities were mainly humans (e.g. employees or cus-
tomers). However, within IoT most of the identities will be of non-human origin.
They are highly heterogeneous as they have different attributes which need to
be managed correctly. An employee holds, for example, attributes regarding his
department while an IoT device is assigned an attribute software version track-
ing the current status of its software. To ensure interoperability, the IAM
environment must be able to manage those attributes, data sources, and policies
from different sources [25].
Finally there must be a scalable mechanism to manage device identities, au-
thentication, and authorization to enable trusted interactions between devices
[25]. An IAM platform has to ensure full operability regardless the number of
managed identities and the accompanying requirements for storage and network
consumption. However, current approaches are not able to fulfill this as the
number of identities within a network is far beyond present numbers [33].
4 Blockchain-based IAM in an Enterprise Context
Having outlined major challenges for IAM when it comes to regulating IoT, in
this Chapter we take a closer look at the blockchain technology (Section 4.1)
and how it can potentially be applied to address these obstacles (Section 4.2).
4.1 Blockchain Technology: Beyond Cryptocurrencies
Blockchain technology was first introduced as enabling technology for the Bitcoin
cryptocurrency. Bitcoin implements a blockchain network, i.e. a decentralized set
of nodes which all hold a valid copy of the blockchain. The network must establish
consensus on the chronology of transactions to establish an authoritative, final
transaction log on all nodes [6]. In so-called public blockchains such as Bitcoin,
access to the network is not restricted. Thus, anybody can join and participate.
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To prevent public blockchains from being vulnerable to sibyl attacks [8], compu-
tationally difficult consensus mechanisms such as proof of work (PoW) in Bitcoin
are applied. However, temporary collisions can emerge in public blockchains due
to network delays which require the application of conflict resolution rules [31].
In private blockchain networks, participants are known and whitelisted. Such a
system is also referred to as private or permissioned blockchain. The nodes which
establish a private blockchain must be initially authorized by a trusted authority
[29]. This process can be referred to as node identity management [31]. Up to
now, several blockchain frameworks have been developed for different purposes
and with different design and functional properties. The Hyperledger project is
one well-known example which aims at the establishment of an open standard
for blockchain-based enterprise business transactions. From a security point of
view, the Hyperledger architecture intends node authentication via a certificate
authority which distributes enrollment certificates to the nodes. Transactions
are encrypted using a symmetric key per blockchain which all peers in the net-
work hold. For future versions, more fine-grained encryption for transactions is
planned [4].
Due to node identity management, private blockchains can rely on computation-
ally inexpensive, voting-based consensus mechanisms, thus enabling processing
of tens of thousands of transactions per second. One class of consensus mecha-
nisms for private blockchains which is currently employed is based on the Byzan-
tine Fault-Tolerant (BFT) Protocol [16]. BFT consensus mechanisms offer
consensus finality which means that all correctly working nodes will process
blocks within their copy of blockchain in the same way (e.g. by applying the
same rules and policies). This condition prevents the emergence of collisions
[31]. The fault assumption underlying BFT consensus requires that among n
validating nodes, the number of nodes behaving arbitrarily does not exceed 33%
[4]. Figure 3 illustrates a simplified transaction validation process in a private
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blockchain. An entity which wants to submit data to the blockchain encapsu-
lates the request into a transaction and proposes it to the validating nodes. The
validating nodes enforce a given set of contract rules by the replicated execu-
tion of smart contracts. Smart contracts are self-executing scripts which can
enforce the properties of an arbitrary digital contract. A smart contract can be
triggered by issuing a transaction to its unique address on the blockchain [6].
The consensus protocol ensures that the transactions applied on each node do
not diverge. By means of state-machine replication [28], consistent replication
of a smart contract in a decentralized network can be realized [31]. In case of
Hyperledger Fabric a BFT-based consensus mechanism is applied [4]. To prevent
diverging states between the nodes, smart contracts need to be deterministic. In
case of Hyperledger Fabric, smart contracts can be installed to each node in a
blockchain network by issuing a so-called deploy transaction. Figure 3 further
indicates that node identity management is required to initially select validating
nodes. Dynamically changing sets of validating nodes are planned for future ver-
sions of Hyperledger Fabric. Non-Validating Nodes are supported which receive
transactions and forward them to the validating nodes [4].
Vukolic [31] states that a BFT network always maintains its correct state and
consensus finality despite arbitrarily long asynchrony. According to Fischer et al.
[9], faulty nodes can lead to a state in which consensus is never reached when a
network is entirely asynchronous. Integrity of the blockchain would still be main-
tained in this scenario. However, the system would be prevented from making
further consensus decisions. Thus, availability of the service might be affected.
In the following section, recently published frameworks and approaches which
apply the blockchain technology to IAM within an IoT environment will be
discussed under consideration of the challenges described in Section 3.
4.2 Blockchain-based Enterprise IAM for IoT
Recent research literature outlines promising approaches and ideas regarding the
use of blockchain technology to enhance the security of specific IAM functions
for application in an IoT scenario. Even though the ideas presented in the follow-
ing are to some extent designed for public blockchain use-cases, we find that the
adaption to the organizational context could be beneficial regarding the chal-
lenges discussed in Section 3. Evaluation of advantages and disadvantages and
description of a practical enterprise use-case will take place later on. Identity
Management. Zhu et al. [33] propose a blockchain-based identity framework
for IoT (BIFIT) for smart home environments. The framework enables the man-
agement of IoT devices by their respective device owner. Owner identities are
held on a blockchain and managed by transactions. Owners randomly create the
key pairs used to generate identifiers and credentials from the same seed used
for their own identity. Device identities further contain the owner’s signature as
an attribute. This approach can be applied to all kind of IoT devices, thus en-
suring interoperability. The digital identities of owners are created by issuing
a transaction to a blockchain which contains an identifier hash value, key pairs,
the identity signature, and a storage pointer. The owner identity is stored in the
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blockchain in a tamper-proof way and can be used for validation. Update or
revocation transactions can be performed to revoke or update an owner’s iden-
tity. Lookup transactions for information retrieval can be used to enable reliable
authentication. IoT devices only need to store the block header of the identity
chain to authenticate other devices. By this means, resource usage is limited to
enhance suitability for resource-constraint devices. The authors predict a
growth rate of blockchain which is far lower than the rate of the Bitcoin network
because transactions can only be issued by owners and not by all nodes. This
supports scalability in terms of network and storage consumption [33].
Access Control. Maesa et al. [17] leverage blockchain to store representations
of access rights to a specific resource in a tamper-proof way and to manage
those rights via blockchain transactions. Access rules are employed by attribute
based access control (ABAC) [14] policies. Policies consist of conditions defin-
ing a set of allowed values for attributes and specify the actions which subjects
are entitled to perform on the addressed resource. Attributes can be related to
the subject demanding access, the resource, or the environment. Policies are ini-
tially defined by the resource’s owner who issues a policy creation transaction
to the blockchain. Resource owners can update and revoke policies by issuing
update or revocation transactions to the blockchain respectively. Resource own-
ers can change their policies over time. All changes such as policy updates and
right transfers are timestamped and logged to the blockchain in a traceable way.
Resource owners can issue right transfer transactions which are linked to a par-
ticular subject. When receiving a subject’s request for access to a resource, a
policy enforcement point authenticates the subject by its id and a challenge
and queries the blockchain for transactions holding relevant policy data. It then
builds a standard XACML policy [10] which is transferred to a policy decision
point where it is evaluated against the subject’s attributes. Maesa et al. state
that putting policy evaluation and execution in a smart contract will be subject
to their future research work [17]. The IoT context is not directly addressed
in the work of Maesa et al. However, the framework only requires subjects to
hold an ID and to sign a challenge which may contribute to portability to
resource-constraint devices.
Shafagh et al. [29] leverage the blockchain technology to manage ownerships and
sharings of data streams provided by IoT devices. Owners can share data streams
by issuing a new transaction to the blockchain which holds the identifier of the
data stream and the service’s public key. The potential impact of a node acting
maliciously is limited because each node only holds a small encrypted piece of a
data stream. A user who wants to revoke access rights to a data stream changes
the encryption key and shares it with all authorized services except the one
to be revoked. Additionally, the owner issues a new transaction which replaces
previous permissions. This also facilitates monitoring of access management ac-
tivity. The blockchain does not hold these chunks but only their hash pointer to
the previous chunk. It contains a hash pointer of each chunk to ensure tamper-
proof storage, i.e. integrity. The authors propose a decentralized and encrypted
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storage layer to further ensure confidentiality of the stored stream data. Besides
security this also supports scalability in terms of storage consumption
because only a hash pointer needs to be appended to the immutable blockchain
[29].
Storage and Monitoring. Polyzos & Fotiou [23] emphasize that the tamper-
proof storage property is beneficious for the development of robust monitoring
mechanisms. Users cannot deny having approved a transaction because the au-
thenticity of blockchain is verified by a network of nodes. An attacker would
have to forge a digital signature and gain control over a larger share of nodes in
the network to alter information held within a blockchain [29]. Thus, only valid
transactions can be kept within a blockchain which ensures non-repudiation
of the logged information [23].
Azaria et al. [2] demonstrate that a blockchain which incorporates smart con-
tracts can provide powerful backup and monitoring functionality. Due to the
decentralized nature of storage, a complete log of the issued transactions will
remain in the blockchain, no matter whether a user leaves or rejoins the network
over an arbitrary period of time. Access to the respective log only requires the
download of the latest version of the blockchain. The blockchain log is main-
tained as long as there are nodes in the network [2].
Maesa et al. [17] state that the persistent, immutable storage of data in a
blockchain requires the definition of a protocol which minimizes the amount
of data necessary per transaction to enable scalability in terms of storage
space requirements in the entire network. An easy solution would be the stor-
age of a record containing a link to the data stored in an external database
together with a cryptographic hash of the data to store. This approach would
still hold the data in a tamper-proof way while needing significantly less storage.
However, external storage would not achieve the benefits of decentralized storage
in the blockchain in terms of other protection goals such as availability. Thus,
Maesa et al. [17] propose an approach where the entire information is stored in
the blockchain in an encoded format which aims at rewriting data fields to a
representation with constant size. The easiest example would be rewriting the
operators AND, OR to the numerical representations 0, 1. To achieve a mapping
of attribute names and values in representations of a length of e.g. 1 byte, pub-
licly available conventions must be maintained [17]. This approach might also be
applicable to all kinds of structured data which is of interest for monitoring, e.g.
access logs to a resource involving a timestamp, a user id, and a target resource.
By this means, more scalable blockchain-based monitoring approaches in terms
of storage space requirements could be achieved [17].
At this point, we outlined an abstract view of how the blockchain can be applied
to the different IAM functions. Figure 4 illustrates a simplified model of the po-
tential interaction of the different IAM functions and the blockchain. It is based
on the blockchain implementation proposed by the research work presented in
this section. It shows at which position of a generic IAM process adapting the
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blockchain can be applied usefully and provides an example per IAM operation.
Figure 4 illustrates that blockchain technology can be applied to all three basic
IAM operations, namely identity management, access control, and monitoring.
In the following Section, a use case will focus on the potential applicability of
blockchain to IAM in the enterprise domain.
5 Application Scenario for an Enterprise IAM
In this Chapter, a comprehensive use case for the application of the blockchain
technology to IAM and enterprise IoT will be described. It addresses the chal-
lenges described in Section 3 and applies some of the ideas presented in Section 4.
As the scope of enterprise IAM is usually restricted to corporate systems and
users, a private blockchain is assumed in the following. Figure 5 illustrates the
use case including all three main components of modern enterprise IAM men-
tioned within Section 1. Each color highlights a specific component.
Let’s assume a manufacturing company where employees leverage the support
of smart devices. The devices automatically trigger actions based on the analysis
of sensor data provided by the machines working in an assembly line. Entitled
employees or devices should be able to access sensor data which is aggregated in
a sensor data storage as illustrated in Figure 5. A private blockchain is applied
to support all relevant IAM functions as noted above. Thus, each employee and
each smart device needs an identity containing different kind of master data such
as personal information and references to a department, team, location, etc. The
hash of the identity is used as a unique identifier. The identity management
process which is illustrated by green arrows in Figure 5 is initiated by entering
the identity information of a new employee or device into the system. The en-
crypted identity information is stored in a central identity store. Besides that,
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a key pair is created and together with the hash of the identity encapsulated
into a blockchain transaction which is signed with the private key. In the case
of device identities, the firmware and configuration running on the device can
be hashed and stored on the blockchain to make potential unauthorized changes
to the device traceable. Devices will be rejected from access when unauthorized
alterations of the firmware or configuration are recognized (as e.g. proposed by
[15].
After issuing the transaction, each node in the private blockchain network runs
a consensus protocol, validates the transaction, and appends it to the blockchain.
It should be noted that this is a simplified example and does not utilize a spe-
cific protocol. Update and revocation transactions are triggered when identity
updates or the deletion of an identity by the employee or an authorized adminis-
trator take place. If now, for example, a device initiates communication e.g. via
smartphone of an employee to deliver sensor data, the employee can A) identify
the device securely by validating its signature using the public key stored in the
blockchain. B) The employee can ensure that the device was not manipulated
by comparing the hash value stored in the blockchain with the hash value of the
actual data delivered with the request.
To protect critical resources from unauthorized access, suitable access control
needs to be applied. In Figure 5, access control operations and entities are
illustrated by the blue-colored arrows and entities. Our access control scheme
is based on the commonly used ABAC defined by Hu et al. [14]. The scenario
starts with an administrator who creates new access control policies and issues
them as transactions to the blockchain (access rules). For example, employees
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and devices could hold an attribute ”emergency operations”. A policy could
then enforce that all users or devices which hold this specific attribute are able
to access temperature sensor data of engines. However, additional attributes are
necessary to read or write more critical information such as prototype blueprints
which can be sent to the construction plant.
In the scenario illustrated in Figure 5 the access control component receives the
access request of a user containing the user’s attributes (access attempt) and
queries the relevant policies from the blockchain (query policies). It then as-
sesses the policy rules against the attributes and makes a decision (authenticate
and evaluate policies, append decision). In a next step, access decision logic could
be implemented directly on the blockchain using smart contracts.
Under the aspect of monitoring (in color red) all nodes appended to the
blockchain can be monitored as the blockchain itself can be regarded as a log
storage. Any user action gets appended to the blockchain including the identity’s
unique identifier as well as additional information regarding its action. This could
be the respective entitlement that was evaluated or any further attributes avail-
able (e.g. IP address or timestamp). Malicious activities can then be detected
by comparing the identity’s behavior with the historic usage pattern which re-
mains within the blockchain and can be retrieved by traversing the blockchain
and searching for all logs with the identity’s unique identifier (query data for
monitoring). An advantage compared to traditional logging mechanisms is the
decentralized data storage within the blockchain. A malicious attacker cannot
easily manipulate the log collection (e.g. by deleting logs after an attack) by
targeting only one log server. Because the logs are stored on many different de-
vices via blockchain technology an attacker would need to maintain control over
a specific amount of devices (based on BFT this would be more than 33% as
discussed in Section 4.1).
6 Discussion
As described in Section 1, the secure and reliable implementation of IAM func-
tions is a precondition to maintain enterprise security. Beyond comprehensive
security, IoT requires IAM to deal with additional challenges such as device
constraints, heterogeneity, and scalability. However, traditional centralized ap-
proaches imply a single-point-of-failure which poses the threat of compromise or
failure of highly security-relevant IAM functions such as identity provisioning,
permission assignment, access control, or monitoring of user or device behavior
in case of e.g. unauthorized data tampering.
All operations which are performed by issuing transactions are immutably logged
to the blockchain, thus enabling a transparent, tamper-proof log of all security-
relevant operations. However, Section 4.1 shows that public blockchains lack
scalability in terms of large numbers of clients and transactions due to very low
transaction processing rates. This reasons the usage of computationally inten-
sive consensus mechanisms. Beyond that, Section 4.1 has shown that private
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blockchains offer proper scalability in terms of large numbers of clients and
transactions. This makes private blockchains more suitable for common enter-
prise application scenarios than public blockchains.
The results of the frameworks within Section 4.2 further indicate that scalabil-
ity in terms of space requirements can be managed. The same applies for device
interoperability and suitability for resource constraint devices. However, it is
worth noting that the latter two challenges depend on the concrete implementa-
tion and cannot be solved by the mere deployment of a blockchain. Nonetheless,
the research work in Section 4.2 addresses those challenges successfully as the
design of their frameworks for instance does not require the storage of the entire
blockchain on devices, or takes measures to keep blockchain growth on a mod-
erate level.
Private blockchains imply several limitations which may affect potential IAM
applications for IoT in enterprises. As stated in Section 4.1, the implementation
of a private blockchain currently requires a trusted entity at least for initial node
identity management. This could as well constitute a single-point-of-failure if a
centralized entity is elected for this task. However, according to Rodrigues et
al. [24], dynamic reconfiguration of system memberships in BFT-based systems
are generally possible after initial election. While private blockchains provide
significantly better scalability in terms of large numbers of clients, BFT pro-
tocols which are currently employed in several private blockchain architectures
are generally considered as not scalable towards increasing numbers of nodes
due to a large network latency [18]. This is due to the large number of network
interactions required between nodes. However, according to Vukolic [32], node
scalability has not been tested intensively yet beyond a network size of 20 nodes.
From a security point of view, a too small set of nodes could relativize the in-
crease in security as it might become easier for an attacker to reach the critical
number of compromised nodes. As this is a theoretical consideration, further
research could examine whether the number of nodes has a practical implication
on a system’s vulnerability against Sybil attacks which might, for instance, be
performed by malicious insiders with sufficient permissions. Even though private
blockchains surpass public blockchains in terms of performance and scalability,
further research will benchmark whether the performance of private implemen-
tations meets the requirements of time-critical use-cases.
7 Conclusion
The rise of IoT poses new challenges for IAM in enterprises. The purpose of this
paper is to assess how blockchain-based IAM can deal with theses obstacles, and
to demonstrate this in a practical use-case. IoT implies an increased demand for
secure and comprehensive IAM operations, interoperability between heteroge-
neous devices and support for resource constraint devices as well as scalability
in terms of network and storage consumption. Private blockchains can contribute
several important properties for the enterprise context such as secure tamper-
proof storage of IAM data without reliance on a single-point-of-failure. Beyond
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that, private blockchains provide much better scalability towards large numbers
of clients and transactions than public blockchains. Our research indicates that
scalability in terms of space requirements, interoperability, and support for re-
source constraint devices in IAM scenarios are manageable. However, private
blockchains might still require a central trusted entity for (initial) node identity
management and lack scalability regarding larger networks of nodes. The use
case presented in Section 5 demonstrates that blockchain can pose a reliable
data storage for all major IAM operations and can form the basis for the design
of comprehensive IAM architecture in common enterprise IoT scenarios.
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